Pages that link to "Item:Q2682005"
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The following pages link to Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts (Q2682005):
Displaying 15 items.
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring (Q337806) (← links)
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (Q926882) (← links)
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting (Q996364) (← links)
- Earnings profile and monitoring under asymmetric information (Q1389432) (← links)
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant? (Q1897313) (← links)
- Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints (Q2049495) (← links)
- Monitoring, moral hazard, and turnover (Q2256986) (← links)
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring (Q2283129) (← links)
- Commitment and observability in a contracting environment (Q2389297) (← links)
- Monitoring innovation (Q2675453) (← links)
- Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring (Q3382430) (← links)
- Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard (Q4017545) (← links)
- Self-Selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts (Q4033905) (← links)
- Optimal Monitoring Schedule in Dynamic Contracts (Q5144766) (← links)
- Paying with information (Q6076905) (← links)