The following pages link to Marriage, honesty, and stability (Q2921653):
Displaying 50 items.
- Asymptotic existence of proportionally fair allocations (Q277310) (← links)
- College admissions with stable score-limits (Q302118) (← links)
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
- Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility (Q508413) (← links)
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764) (← links)
- Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment (Q738938) (← links)
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608) (← links)
- Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- ``Timing is everything'' and marital bliss (Q1601455) (← links)
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof (Q1622367) (← links)
- The object allocation problem with random priorities (Q1651226) (← links)
- Matching in the large: an experimental study (Q1651242) (← links)
- Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match (Q1651286) (← links)
- Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (Q1668286) (← links)
- Recent studies of agent incentives in internet resource allocation and pricing (Q1728405) (← links)
- Protective behavior in matching models (Q1804637) (← links)
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market (Q1906447) (← links)
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm (Q1953489) (← links)
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets (Q1984501) (← links)
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches (Q2049465) (← links)
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm (Q2060701) (← links)
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice (Q2157898) (← links)
- Recent studies of agent incentives in Internet resource allocation and pricing (Q2159522) (← links)
- Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly (Q2178023) (← links)
- Entering classes in the college admissions model (Q2212783) (← links)
- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design (Q2220932) (← links)
- Untruthful dominant strategies for the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2275655) (← links)
- A stable marriage requires communication (Q2278950) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Stable matchings with covering constraints: a complete computational trichotomy (Q2309466) (← links)
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice (Q2318120) (← links)
- Verifiability and group formation in markets (Q2324808) (← links)
- Matching of like rank and the size of the core in the marriage problem (Q2345222) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2455677) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
- New techniques and tighter bounds for local computation algorithms (Q2628795) (← links)
- The graphs of stably matchable pairs (Q2672447) (← links)
- Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (Q2931695) (← links)
- Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (Q3382383) (← links)
- Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets (Q4971365) (← links)
- Closing Gaps in Asymptotic Fair Division (Q4986806) (← links)
- Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets (Q5058044) (← links)
