Pages that link to "Item:Q2959848"
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The following pages link to Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design (Q2959848):
Displaying 15 items.
- Truthful fair division without free disposal (Q826615) (← links)
- Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents (Q1041237) (← links)
- Approximate maximin shares for groups of agents (Q1748541) (← links)
- Fractionally subadditive maximization under an incremental knapsack constraint (Q2085751) (← links)
- Simple and efficient budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular valuations (Q2190400) (← links)
- Multiple birds with one stone: beating 1/2 for EFX and GMMS via envy cycle elimination (Q2202022) (← links)
- Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World (Q2959835) (← links)
- Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design (Q2959848) (← links)
- Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online (Q5868957) (← links)
- Budget feasible mechanisms on matroids (Q5925520) (← links)
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions (Q6136107) (← links)
- Budget feasible mechanisms for procurement auctions with divisible agents (Q6164502) (← links)
- On improved interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets (Q6164503) (← links)
- Fractionally Subadditive Maximization under an Incremental Knapsack Constraint with Applications to Incremental Flows (Q6202753) (← links)
- Partial allocations in budget-feasible mechanism design: bridging multiple levels of service and divisible agents (Q6609125) (← links)