Pages that link to "Item:Q3168969"
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The following pages link to Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets (Q3168969):
Displaying 21 items.
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q308606) (← links)
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
- Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
- Characterizations of the cumulative offer process (Q682475) (← links)
- Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828) (← links)
- Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment (Q738938) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957) (← links)
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents (Q1626247) (← links)
- Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution (Q1748535) (← links)
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2105701) (← links)
- The aviation technology two-sided matching with the expected time based on the probabilistic linguistic preference relations (Q2176823) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities (Q5247606) (← links)
- Decision method for two-sided matching with interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets considering matching aspirations (Q5282786) (← links)
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information (Q6090465) (← links)
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent (Q6565778) (← links)