Pages that link to "Item:Q3168993"
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The following pages link to What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory (Q3168993):
Displaying 13 items.
- On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles (Q765218) (← links)
- A surgical scheduling method considering surgeons' preferences (Q887894) (← links)
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents (Q1626247) (← links)
- Relationship between matching and assignment problems (Q1759191) (← links)
- Stability and median rationalizability for aggregate matchings (Q2052526) (← links)
- The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences (Q2212761) (← links)
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (Q2463787) (← links)
- The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings (Q2857040) (← links)
- Decision method for two-sided matching with interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets considering matching aspirations (Q5282786) (← links)
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems (Q5964688) (← links)
- On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings (Q6059562) (← links)
- Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy (Q6063089) (← links)
- Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models (Q6615355) (← links)