Pages that link to "Item:Q3320086"

The following pages link to Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents (Q3320086):

Displaying 50 items.

• An envelope approach to tournament design (Q268598) (← links)
• Peer effects and incentives (Q290169) (← links)
• Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types (Q380943) (← links)
• All-or-nothing payments (Q443750) (← links)
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation (Q665451) (← links)
• Common shocks and relative compensation (Q665735) (← links)
• Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies (Q714788) (← links)
• Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare (Q777701) (← links)
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (Q794886) (← links)
• On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard (Q844941) (← links)
• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts (Q900449) (← links)
• Normative properties of stock market equilibrium with moral hazard (Q924937) (← links)
• Information in tournaments under limited liability (Q999734) (← links)
• Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry (Q1018021) (← links)
• Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games (Q1022382) (← links)
• Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions (Q1045983) (← links)
• Ignorance in a multi-agent setting (Q1046299) (← links)
• Incentive schemes with multiple agents and bankcruptcy constraints (Q1097823) (← links)
• Stopping agents from ``cheating'' (Q1117129) (← links)
• A note on modelling tournaments (Q1198214) (← links)
• Executive compensation: a calibration approach (Q1269785) (← links)
• Quality of group decisions (Q1271078) (← links)
• Optimal retention in agency problems (Q1276112) (← links)
• Decentralization and collusion (Q1277089) (← links)
• Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency (Q1341508) (← links)
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude (Q1357585) (← links)
• Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents (Q1367910) (← links)
• Implementing coordinated team play (Q1367913) (← links)
• Ranking agencies under moral hazard (Q1381089) (← links)
• Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems (Q1577932) (← links)
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection (Q1584555) (← links)
• Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard (Q1601448) (← links)
• Competitive prizes: when less scrutiny induces more effort (Q1602939) (← links)
• Team incentives under moral and altruistic preferences: which team to choose? (Q1656968) (← links)
• Moral hazard and tradeable pollution emission permits (Q1674999) (← links)
• Reciprocity in the principal-multiple agent model (Q1675000) (← links)
• Reward schemes (Q1691347) (← links)
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations (Q1876651) (← links)
• Multiple-task and multiple-agent models: Incentive contracts and an application to point pollution control (Q1890651) (← links)
• Linear incentive schemes and Poisson processes in economic agency models (Q1908039) (← links)
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns (Q1932540) (← links)
• Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference (Q2002074) (← links)
• Optimal incentives schemes under \textit{Homo moralis} preferences (Q2052518) (← links)
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities (Q2267373) (← links)
• The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice (Q2343329) (← links)
• The optimality of team contracts (Q2351252) (← links)
• Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard (Q2455678) (← links)
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise (Q2469846) (← links)
• Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm (Q2490712) (← links)
• The principal-agent problem with adaptive players (Q2563563) (← links)