The following pages link to (Q3354677):
Displaying 39 items.
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence (Q290178) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- A robustness result for rationalizable implementation (Q536103) (← links)
- Perfect implementation (Q625041) (← links)
- Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity (Q629333) (← links)
- Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games (Q629335) (← links)
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms (Q632946) (← links)
- Common belief and common knowledge (Q690342) (← links)
- Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade (Q805485) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty (Q900451) (← links)
- Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example (Q909592) (← links)
- A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information (Q912008) (← links)
- Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions (Q1121185) (← links)
- The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements (Q1864820) (← links)
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading (Q2031173) (← links)
- New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting (Q2067400) (← links)
- Relatively robust decisions (Q2112301) (← links)
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions (Q2173111) (← links)
- Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly (Q2178023) (← links)
- Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information (Q2178647) (← links)
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory (Q2253830) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction (Q2346320) (← links)
- Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values (Q2357821) (← links)
- Impact of higher-order uncertainty (Q2384440) (← links)
- Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition (Q2425155) (← links)
- Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values (Q2670908) (← links)
- Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition (Q3387955) (← links)
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality (Q5963306) (← links)
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents (Q6062957) (← links)
- Econometric inference on a large Bayesian game with heterogeneous beliefs (Q6090550) (← links)
- Price discrimination with robust beliefs (Q6106503) (← links)
- The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism (Q6188676) (← links)
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent (Q6565778) (← links)
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values (Q6581890) (← links)
- Are the players in an interactive belief model meta-certain of the model itself? (Q6642573) (← links)
