Pages that link to "Item:Q3382383"
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The following pages link to Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (Q3382383):
Displaying 26 items.
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
- Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764) (← links)
- Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment (Q738938) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets (Q1800976) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets (Q1984501) (← links)
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070) (← links)
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches (Q2049465) (← links)
- Quantile stable mechanisms (Q2052538) (← links)
- Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets (Q2059069) (← links)
- Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences (Q2140473) (← links)
- Verifiability and group formation in markets (Q2324808) (← links)
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large (Q2328512) (← links)
- Electronic service matching: failure of incentive compatibility in vickrey auctions (Q2417158) (← links)
- Marriage, honesty, and stability (Q2921653) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness in the Large (Q4627463) (← links)
- (Q5053286) (← links)
- Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets (Q5090028) (← links)
- Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
- Stability in repeated matching markets (Q6180420) (← links)
- Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets (Q6185480) (← links)