Pages that link to "Item:Q3402040"
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The following pages link to A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES (Q3402040):
Displaying 7 items.
- The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency (Q521883) (← links)
- Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (Q1730143) (← links)
- Socially structured games (Q2370085) (← links)
- The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games (Q2371152) (← links)
- A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set (Q2388770) (← links)
- Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core (Q3299272) (← links)
- Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core (Q4602184) (← links)