Pages that link to "Item:Q3576882"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions (Q3576882):
Displaying 16 items.
- How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? (Q308633) (← links)
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring (Q337806) (← links)
- A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives (Q471170) (← links)
- On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time (Q501748) (← links)
- Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal (Q536081) (← links)
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion (Q1753675) (← links)
- Some notes and comments on the efficient use of information in repeated games with Poisson signals (Q1785361) (← links)
- An experiment on the value of structural information in a \(2\times2\) repeated game. (Q1853703) (← links)
- A dynamic theory of war and peace (Q1958959) (← links)
- Reasoning about `when' instead of `what': collusive equilibria with stochastic timing in repeated oligopoly (Q2099010) (← links)
- Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact (Q2276558) (← links)
- Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags (Q2439908) (← links)
- (Q3299328) (← links)
- Repeated Games with Frequent Signals<sup>*</sup> (Q5850901) (← links)
- Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game (Q6194372) (← links)
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games (Q6536588) (← links)
