Pages that link to "Item:Q3780708"
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The following pages link to The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem (Q3780708):
Displaying 36 items.
- Dynamic moral hazard without commitment (Q267083) (← links)
- Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection (Q375021) (← links)
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment (Q423781) (← links)
- Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats (Q682462) (← links)
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem (Q751456) (← links)
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit? (Q900252) (← links)
- A solvable continuous time dynamic principal-agent model (Q900607) (← links)
- Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (Q913628) (← links)
- Efficiency and equity in dynamic principal-agent problems (Q1186999) (← links)
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency (Q1268636) (← links)
- Optimal retention in agency problems (Q1276112) (← links)
- Long-sighted principal and myopic agents (Q1300431) (← links)
- Strategic transmission of information and short-term commitment (Q1300685) (← links)
- A theorem on multi-period insurance contracts without commitment (Q1302131) (← links)
- The principal/agent paradigm: Its relevance to various functional fields (Q1309986) (← links)
- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion (Q1622464) (← links)
- Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment (Q1624474) (← links)
- A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem (Q1727286) (← links)
- Dynamic relational contracts under complete information (Q1753710) (← links)
- Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts (Q2016226) (← links)
- The principal-agent problem for service rate event-dependency (Q2060406) (← links)
- Principal-agent problem under the linear contract (Q2084610) (← links)
- The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference (Q2146599) (← links)
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity (Q2318119) (← links)
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication (Q2455660) (← links)
- Dynamic yardstick mechanisms (Q2491877) (← links)
- The principal-agent problem with adaptive players (Q2563563) (← links)
- Optimal equilibrium contracts in the infinite horizon with no commitment across periods (Q2694752) (← links)
- Conditional Analysis and a Principal-Agent Problem (Q3188152) (← links)
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (Q3780710) (← links)
- Myopic Agency (Q4610918) (← links)
- Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring (Q4883969) (← links)
- The Political Economy of Indirect Control * (Q4962981) (← links)
- Random Horizon Principal-Agent Problems (Q5037495) (← links)
- Principal-Agent Models (Q5149738) (← links)
- Private Information and Intertemporal Job Assignments1 (Q5474468) (← links)