Pages that link to "Item:Q4138424"
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The following pages link to Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem (Q4138424):
Displaying 50 items.
- Huge progeny production during the transient of a quasi-species model of viral infection, reproduction and mutation (Q409770) (← links)
- Participation and demand levels for a joint project (Q485433) (← links)
- Scheduling under dynamic speed-scaling for minimizing weighted completion time and energy consumption (Q499333) (← links)
- Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard (Q522996) (← links)
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods (Q522997) (← links)
- Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission (Q523008) (← links)
- One man, one bid (Q523013) (← links)
- Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms (Q523018) (← links)
- Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses (Q523020) (← links)
- Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability (Q523027) (← links)
- Does team competition increase pro-social lending? Evidence from online microfinance (Q523029) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing (Q532731) (← links)
- A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Q617627) (← links)
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms (Q645640) (← links)
- Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma (Q665097) (← links)
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence (Q665108) (← links)
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms (Q673297) (← links)
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments (Q687051) (← links)
- Economic juries and public project provision (Q738105) (← links)
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension (Q749420) (← links)
- Competitive equilibrium with local public goods (Q754094) (← links)
- A note on the relationship of interdependent action to the optimality of certain voting decisions (Q760326) (← links)
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria (Q789297) (← links)
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties (Q790698) (← links)
- Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theory (Q792203) (← links)
- Class shares and economies of scope (Q803015) (← links)
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods (Q809860) (← links)
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach (Q844930) (← links)
- Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population (Q869884) (← links)
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations (Q999738) (← links)
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results (Q1001138) (← links)
- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer (Q1021613) (← links)
- Discrete implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Q1022383) (← links)
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont (Q1022388) (← links)
- A difficulty with the ''command'' allocation mechanism (Q1054630) (← links)
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons (Q1055323) (← links)
- One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions (Q1085020) (← links)
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism (Q1108174) (← links)
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences (Q1119142) (← links)
- On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria (Q1131927) (← links)
- Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control (Q1141583) (← links)
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria (Q1148777) (← links)
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments (Q1162430) (← links)
- Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by abelian operations (Q1164519) (← links)
- Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core (Q1164547) (← links)
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities (Q1174591) (← links)
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies (Q1201842) (← links)
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism (Q1207011) (← links)
- Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax (Q1236060) (← links)
