The following pages link to Roland Strausz (Q417634):
Displaying 20 items.
- Mediated contracts and mechanism design (Q417635) (← links)
- Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents'' [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] (Q643288) (← links)
- Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality (Q1046314) (← links)
- Efficiency in sequential partnerships (Q1289255) (← links)
- Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case (Q1583272) (← links)
- Optimality of sequential screening with multiple units and ex post participation constraints (Q1668225) (← links)
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result (Q1682735) (← links)
- Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle (Q1927315) (← links)
- VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities (Q1929830) (← links)
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening (Q2343401) (← links)
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication (Q2455660) (← links)
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models (Q2496238) (← links)
- Ordinary shares and managers (Q2499539) (← links)
- Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening (Q3398230) (← links)
- Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship (Q4256245) (← links)
- Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship (Q4368684) (← links)
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case (Q4531031) (← links)
- Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights (Q4610729) (← links)
- (Q4610867) (← links)
- Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning (Q5198892) (← links)
