Pages that link to "Item:Q4320058"
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The following pages link to Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent (Q4320058):
Displaying 8 items.
- The strategically ignorant principal (Q523523) (← links)
- The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case (Q665107) (← links)
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability (Q900426) (← links)
- Signalling ability to pay and rent sharing dynamics (Q953720) (← links)
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance (Q1674980) (← links)
- Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction? (Q2695781) (← links)
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values (Q4586109) (← links)
- Firm-fit transparency and incentives (Q6498754) (← links)