Pages that link to "Item:Q4368684"
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The following pages link to Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship (Q4368684):
Displaying 16 items.
- Managerial ownership with rent-seeking employees (Q481368) (← links)
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (Q926882) (← links)
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting (Q996364) (← links)
- On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies (Q1572945) (← links)
- The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation. (Q1862638) (← links)
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant? (Q1897313) (← links)
- Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts (Q1925929) (← links)
- Optimal contracts with random monitoring (Q2121460) (← links)
- Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword (Q2211493) (← links)
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring (Q2283129) (← links)
- The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity (Q2436311) (← links)
- Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy (Q2667268) (← links)
- Monitoring innovation (Q2675453) (← links)
- Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain (Q2892134) (← links)
- Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion (Q5132565) (← links)
- Optimal transparency of monitoring capability (Q6163286) (← links)