Pages that link to "Item:Q4555694"
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The following pages link to How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?* (Q4555694):
Displaying 12 items.
- A conditional logit model for executive incentives (Q374875) (← links)
- Stock options and capital structure (Q665705) (← links)
- Is option-based compensation restrained by largest potential risk exposure? Evidence from the banking industry (Q777647) (← links)
- Options can induce risk taking for arbitrary preferences (Q818535) (← links)
- Executive compensation: a calibration approach (Q1269785) (← links)
- Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability (Q2015024) (← links)
- A dynamic model of managerial entrenchment and the positive incentives it creates (Q2246693) (← links)
- Cost-efficient performance-vesting equity (Q2315399) (← links)
- Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion (Q2323573) (← links)
- Stock options and managerial optimal contracts (Q2572505) (← links)
- Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?<sup>*</sup> (Q3401205) (← links)
- Executive Compensation and Risk Taking* (Q4554753) (← links)