Pages that link to "Item:Q4586050"
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The following pages link to Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints (Q4586050):
Displaying 15 items.
- An allocation method of provincial college enrollment plan based on bankruptcy model (Q1624720) (← links)
- Limited choice in college admissions: an experimental study (Q1651284) (← links)
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints (Q1677256) (← links)
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits (Q1728163) (← links)
- A college admissions clearinghouse (Q1757598) (← links)
- Graduate admission with financial support (Q1985735) (← links)
- College admissions with tuition transfers (Q2078089) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach (Q2222218) (← links)
- College curriculum, diverging selectivity, and enrollment expansion (Q2323622) (← links)
- Patience is a virtue: the effect of slack on competitiveness for admission control (Q2464387) (← links)
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation (Q6098859) (← links)
- Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based (Q6168831) (← links)
- Efficient matching under general constraints (Q6565039) (← links)
- Dorm augmented college assignments (Q6570727) (← links)