Pages that link to "Item:Q4676177"
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The following pages link to Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring (Q4676177):
Displaying 12 items.
- A hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance (Q470732) (← links)
- Deposit insurance and regulation in a Diamond-Dybvig banking model with a risky technology (Q1367708) (← links)
- Does deposit insurance stimulate capital inflows? (Q1583280) (← links)
- On the relationship between market power and bank risk taking (Q1651042) (← links)
- Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition (Q1762765) (← links)
- The effects of competition on banks' risk taking (Q1762964) (← links)
- The payouts choice for deposit insurance system (Q2330373) (← links)
- Designing sound deposit insurances (Q2402397) (← links)
- The welfare costs of bank regulation by deposit rate ceilings (Q2419894) (← links)
- Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated * (Q4677662) (← links)
- Risk management of deposit insurance corporations with risk-based premiums and credit default swaps (Q5139216) (← links)
- A method to evaluate the rank condition for CCE estimators (Q6585630) (← links)