Pages that link to "Item:Q472193"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents (Q472193):
Displaying 19 items.
- Implementation with partial provability (Q449172) (← links)
- Secure implementation in production economies (Q459407) (← links)
- New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation (Q1672864) (← links)
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (Q1684127) (← links)
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals (Q1792573) (← links)
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions (Q2100648) (← links)
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate (Q2158670) (← links)
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization (Q2206010) (← links)
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules (Q2231399) (← links)
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions (Q2254236) (← links)
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications (Q2305047) (← links)
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting (Q2338654) (← links)
- On single-peaked domains and min-max rules (Q2417386) (← links)
- On the implementation of the median (Q2668985) (← links)
- Implementation with a sympathizer (Q2682027) (← links)
- (Q3455573) (← links)
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions (Q5022149) (← links)
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information (Q5111111) (← links)
