Pages that link to "Item:Q4810828"

The following pages link to Committee Design with Endogenous Information (Q4810828):

Displaying 50 items.

• Jury voting without objective probability (Q258945) (← links)
• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study (Q290181) (← links)
• Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms (Q378333) (← links)
• Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives (Q404769) (← links)
• Voting in small committees (Q405000) (← links)
• Eliciting information from a committee (Q405544) (← links)
• Information acquisition and transparency in committees (Q422363) (← links)
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory (Q523479) (← links)
• Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence (Q523498) (← links)
• Committee design with endogenous participation (Q523502) (← links)
• Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making (Q529769) (← links)
• Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes (Q536079) (← links)
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees (Q550195) (← links)
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680) (← links)
• Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees (Q622586) (← links)
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits (Q694724) (← links)
• The veil of public ignorance (Q705834) (← links)
• Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low? (Q734044) (← links)
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes (Q763358) (← links)
• Information sharing in democratic mechanisms (Q776856) (← links)
• The importance of expertise in group decisions (Q826614) (← links)
• Rational ignorance and voting behavior (Q870760) (← links)
• Consistency and communication in committees (Q893390) (← links)
• Expert advice to a voting body (Q893397) (← links)
• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms (Q900405) (← links)
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees (Q989921) (← links)
• The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences (Q996377) (← links)
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (Q1001814) (← links)
• Reliability of information aggregation with regional biases: A note (Q1025656) (← links)
• The price of `one person, one vote' (Q1704413) (← links)
• Pivotal persuasion (Q1729672) (← links)
• Voting with public information (Q1735780) (← links)
• Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers (Q1863930) (← links)
• Information efficiency and majority decisions (Q1908526) (← links)
• Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case (Q1934706) (← links)
• Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting (Q1943437) (← links)
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication (Q1944864) (← links)
• Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice (Q2002366) (← links)
• Efficient voting with penalties (Q2013363) (← links)
• Optimal delay in committees (Q2049494) (← links)
• When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives (Q2067358) (← links)
• Information disclosure with many alternatives (Q2068884) (← links)
• Voting on tricky questions (Q2078087) (← links)
• A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design (Q2098887) (← links)
• Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions (Q2098951) (← links)
• Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding (Q2099050) (← links)
• Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers (Q2100625) (← links)
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation (Q2168548) (← links)
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment (Q2183999) (← links)
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study (Q2231425) (← links)