Pages that link to "Item:Q4823476"

The following pages link to Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics (Q4823476):

Displaying 46 items.

• Stock market bubbles and unemployment (Q255166) (← links)
• On the recursive saddle point method (Q298294) (← links)
• Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing (Q375019) (← links)
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts (Q405717) (← links)
• Introduction to economic theory of bubbles (Q406275) (← links)
• Sectoral bubbles, misallocation, and endogenous growth (Q406280) (← links)
• A theory of political and economic cycles (Q406397) (← links)
• Expectation driven business cycles with limited enforcement (Q485615) (← links)
• Entrepreneurs, legal institutions and firm dynamics (Q514496) (← links)
• Credit and self-employment (Q621280) (← links)
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment (Q654513) (← links)
• Entrepreneurship and firm heterogeneity with limited enforcement (Q666302) (← links)
• Repeated lending under contractual incompleteness (Q666431) (← links)
• Banking bubbles and financial crises (Q894050) (← links)
• The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs (Q899387) (← links)
• Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy (Q957855) (← links)
• Adverse selection, endogenous borrowing constraints and firm growth (Q988667) (← links)
• The dynamics of competitive equilibrium allocations with borrowing constraints (Q1181231) (← links)
• Communication, commitment, and growth (Q1207489) (← links)
• Firm size, bank size, and financial development (Q1627959) (← links)
• When \(q\) theory meets large losses risks and agency conflicts (Q1650711) (← links)
• Lending terms and aggregate productivity (Q1657476) (← links)
• Optimal timing of decisions: a general theory based on continuation values (Q1734573) (← links)
• Dynamic relational contracts under complete information (Q1753710) (← links)
• Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle (Q1762738) (← links)
• A tractable model of limited enforcement and the life-cycle dynamics of firms (Q1787294) (← links)
• Loan market equilibrium with difference of opinion and imperfect competition. (Q1853725) (← links)
• Optimal lending contracts with long run borrowing constraints (Q1994233) (← links)
• Endogenous borrowing constraints and stagnation in Latin America (Q2007863) (← links)
• Optimal compensation and investment affected by firm size and time-varying external factors (Q2022926) (← links)
• A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints (Q2025005) (← links)
• Agent's optimal compensation under inflation risk by using dynamic contract model (Q2121174) (← links)
• Management cycles (Q2150447) (← links)
• Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment (Q2222211) (← links)
• Working to learn (Q2231428) (← links)
• Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics (Q2397637) (← links)
• Hyperbolic discount curves: a reply to Ainslie (Q2443950) (← links)
• A theory of progressive lending (Q2681508) (← links)
• WEALTH INEQUALITY: DATA AND MODELS (Q3529521) (← links)
• Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (Q3691370) (← links)
• Do Firms Want to Borrow More? Testing Credit Constraints Using a Directed Lending Program (Q4610666) (← links)
• Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract (Q4860684) (← links)
• Lending Relationships and Optimal Monetary Policy (Q5090054) (← links)
• EXIT OPTIONS AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS (Q5406948) (← links)
• Monotone contracts (Q6059541) (← links)
• Commitment and investment distortions under limited liability (Q6664588) (← links)