Pages that link to "Item:Q5049121"
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The following pages link to (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (Q5049121):
Displaying 19 items.
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985) (← links)
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings (Q5095181) (← links)
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism (Q6054914) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS (Q6122165) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design (Q6536583) (← links)
- The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
- Efficient matching under general constraints (Q6565039) (← links)
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent (Q6565778) (← links)
- Dorm augmented college assignments (Q6570727) (← links)
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies (Q6664582) (← links)
- Stability vs. no justified envy (Q6665684) (← links)