Pages that link to "Item:Q532764"
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The following pages link to Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764):
Displaying 7 items.
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion (Q490945) (← links)
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms (Q1338121) (← links)
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized (Q1757600) (← links)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories (Q2140313) (← links)
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion (Q2482673) (← links)
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules (Q2482680) (← links)
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain (Q6176744) (← links)