Pages that link to "Item:Q5379145"
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The following pages link to Optimal Disability Insurance with Moral Hazards: Absenteeism, Presenteeism, and Shirking (Q5379145):
Displaying 6 items.
- The work disincentive effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s (Q291088) (← links)
- Work absences and doctor visits during an illness episode: the differential role of preferences, production, and policies among men and women (Q530926) (← links)
- Optimal sickness benefits in a principal-agent model (Q2058837) (← links)
- Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment (Q2138619) (← links)
- Exploring the Optimal Design of an Employer-Sponsored Sickness-Disability Compensation Insurance Plan When Sickness Presenteeism Is Penalized (Q4689974) (← links)
- Text Mining Methods Applied to Insurance Company Customer Calls: A Case Study (Q5108358) (← links)