Pages that link to "Item:Q5495775"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling (Q5495775):
Displaying 9 items.
- The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design (Q777959) (← links)
- Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values (Q904689) (← links)
- Making random choices invisible to the scheduler (Q979081) (← links)
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (Q1651232) (← links)
- No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems (Q1792559) (← links)
- Revenue maximization with a single sample (Q2347785) (← links)
- Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition (Q3387955) (← links)
- The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling (Q3460800) (← links)
- A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling (Q5918088) (← links)