Pages that link to "Item:Q5955034"

The following pages link to Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments (Q5955034):

Displaying 20 items.

• A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees (Q622566) (← links)
• Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium (Q792856) (← links)
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets (Q857978) (← links)
• On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions (Q859601) (← links)
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice (Q913620) (← links)
• A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games (Q957863) (← links)
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions (Q1084029) (← links)
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees (Q1106706) (← links)
• Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules (Q1377459) (← links)
• A note on the core of voting games (Q1567185) (← links)
• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey (Q1656983) (← links)
• Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games (Q1664280) (← links)
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization (Q1887541) (← links)
• Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model (Q2013360) (← links)
• Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index (Q2171864) (← links)
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness (Q2284447) (← links)
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences (Q2516133) (← links)
• Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies (Q2939700) (← links)
• (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting (Q6164813) (← links)
• Core-stable committees under restricted domains (Q6167258) (← links)