Pages that link to "Item:Q628561"

The following pages link to Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules. (Q628561):

Displaying 50 items.

• The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models (Q284375) (← links)
• Unanimity and the Anscombe's paradox (Q384521) (← links)
• Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? (Q404755) (← links)
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules (Q497471) (← links)
• Another perspective on Borda's paradox (Q683525) (← links)
• Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach (Q719049) (← links)
• Social acceptability of Condorcet committees (Q777455) (← links)
• Polytope volume by descent in the face lattice and applications in social choice (Q823891) (← links)
• The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions (Q826624) (← links)
• On the probability of observing Borda's paradox (Q976964) (← links)
• On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions (Q976973) (← links)
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
• The unexpected behavior of plurality rule (Q1036103) (← links)
• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle (Q1339031) (← links)
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740) (← links)
• The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting (Q1697837) (← links)
• The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet (Q1704412) (← links)
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation. (Q1811244) (← links)
• Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences (Q2114567) (← links)
• An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters (Q2127897) (← links)
• On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences (Q2158613) (← links)
• The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system (Q2179470) (← links)
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
• How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections? (Q2247941) (← links)
• Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections (Q2288880) (← links)
• Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections (Q2300612) (← links)
• A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity (Q2317999) (← links)
• Condorcet efficiency with adaptive parties in a spatial model (Q2389762) (← links)
• Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities (Q2406928) (← links)
• Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice (Q2436696) (← links)
• Exploiting polyhedral symmetries in social choice (Q2452242) (← links)
• Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems (Q2464017) (← links)
• A comparison of theoretical and empirical evaluations of the Borda compromise (Q2513291) (← links)
• Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? (Q2629520) (← links)
• An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes (Q2667570) (← links)
• Exploiting Symmetries in Polyhedral Computations (Q2849003) (← links)
• Borda's paradox under stochastic preference (Q2951281) (← links)
• (Q3125274) (← links)
• Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions (Q5053685) (← links)
• Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (Q5053686) (← links)
• The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (Q5053687) (← links)
• Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules (Q5053691) (← links)
• Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions (Q5053695) (← links)
• Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
• Combinatorics of Election Scores (Q5053699) (← links)
• From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture (Q5053700) (← links)
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
• Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments (Q5902054) (← links)
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness (Q6076911) (← links)