Pages that link to "Item:Q634506"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending (Q634506):
Displaying 15 items.
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach (Q337786) (← links)
- Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance (Q337821) (← links)
- Repeated principal-agent relationships with lending and borrowing (Q375019) (← links)
- On the validity of the first-order approach with moral hazard and hidden assets (Q485717) (← links)
- Unemployment insurance with hidden savings (Q617668) (← links)
- Optimal incentives and the time dimension of performance measurement (Q694727) (← links)
- The informativeness principle without the first-order approach (Q1735785) (← links)
- The first-order approach when the cost of effort is money (Q1940384) (← links)
- Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans (Q1994527) (← links)
- Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function (Q2068069) (← links)
- On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment (Q2462897) (← links)
- Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach (Q4971397) (← links)
- Optimal dynamic contracting: The first‐order approach and beyond (Q5121484) (← links)
- Relational contracts: public versus private savings (Q6536569) (← links)
- Optimal allocations in growth models with private information (Q6590145) (← links)
