Pages that link to "Item:Q662278"

The following pages link to A further note on the college admission game (Q662278):

Displaying 10 items.

• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (Q1077313) (← links)
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets (Q1684134) (← links)
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits (Q1728163) (← links)
• The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (Q1934818) (← links)
• Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities (Q2078086) (← links)
• Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets (Q2121461) (← links)
• The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically (Q2363424) (← links)
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited (Q3821889) (← links)
• Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction (Q6080655) (← links)