Pages that link to "Item:Q688540"
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The following pages link to Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict (Q688540):
Displaying 6 items.
- Collective decision making procedures protected from manipulation. (A survey of the problem) (Q1180910) (← links)
- Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note (Q1908007) (← links)
- Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting (Q2021546) (← links)
- The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto (Q2244407) (← links)
- On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture (Q2345150) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)
