Pages that link to "Item:Q816096"
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The following pages link to Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? (Q816096):
Displaying 33 items.
- Consistent collective decisions under majorities based on difference of votes (Q266525) (← links)
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser (Q274071) (← links)
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules (Q449045) (← links)
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
- Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules (Q656803) (← links)
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees (Q777455) (← links)
- Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting (Q839624) (← links)
- Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: consistency and paradoxes (Q898672) (← links)
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
- The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. (Q1420529) (← links)
- Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules (Q1575378) (← links)
- The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner (Q1606439) (← links)
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740) (← links)
- Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best? (Q2125101) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition (Q2388743) (← links)
- The probability of ties with scoring methods: some results (Q2388824) (← links)
- Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities (Q2406928) (← links)
- On the selection of the same winner by all scoring rules (Q2432509) (← links)
- Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice (Q2436696) (← links)
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis (Q2463576) (← links)
- The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences (Q2500750) (← links)
- Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? (Q2629520) (← links)
- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives (Q2829684) (← links)
- Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention (Q5053686) (← links)
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (Q5053687) (← links)
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
- Combinatorics of Election Scores (Q5053699) (← links)
- From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture (Q5053700) (← links)
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule (Q6564045) (← links)
- Social unacceptability for simple voting procedures (Q6637497) (← links)