Pages that link to "Item:Q834857"

The following pages link to Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (Q834857):

Displaying 24 items.

• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
• Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding (Q526848) (← links)
• The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design (Q777959) (← links)
• Mechanisms for scheduling with single-bit private values (Q904689) (← links)
• A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms (Q1031874) (← links)
• Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (Q1651232) (← links)
• Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design (Q1735730) (← links)
• Incentive compatible mechanisms for scheduling two-parameter job agents on parallel identical machines to minimize the weighted number of late jobs (Q1744245) (← links)
• No truthful mechanism can be better than \(n\) approximate for two natural problems (Q1792559) (← links)
• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification (Q2016253) (← links)
• On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem (Q2018936) (← links)
• Average-case approximation ratio of scheduling without payments (Q2032343) (← links)
• Online scheduling of jobs with favorite machines (Q2289948) (← links)
• A unified approach to truthful scheduling on related machines (Q2800378) (← links)
• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains (Q2819466) (← links)
• Recent Developments in the Mechanism Design Problem for Scheduling (Q3004649) (← links)
• Private Capacities in Mechanism Design (Q3182917) (← links)
• The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling (Q3460800) (← links)
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. (Q5075789) (← links)
• Mechanism Design (Q5149740) (← links)
• TESTING THE QUANTAL RESPONSE HYPOTHESIS (Q5224949) (← links)
• (Q5743446) (← links)
• A new lower bound for deterministic truthful scheduling (Q5918088) (← links)
• On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case (Q6670812) (← links)