Pages that link to "Item:Q928879"
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The following pages link to Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879):
Displaying 18 items.
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations (Q405757) (← links)
- Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
- An efficient solution to the informed principal problem (Q938057) (← links)
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types (Q1014325) (← links)
- Rational budgeters in the theory of social choice (Q1090584) (← links)
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance (Q1268597) (← links)
- A note on Matsushima's regularity condition (Q1806208) (← links)
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions (Q2016235) (← links)
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
- On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget (Q2359380) (← links)
- Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability (Q4585991) (← links)
- Mechanism Design for Correlated Valuations: Efficient Methods for Revenue Maximization (Q5031029) (← links)
- Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design (Q5111103) (← links)
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents (Q6062957) (← links)
- Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values (Q6541011) (← links)
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction (Q6565044) (← links)
- Efficient incentives with social preferences (Q6631802) (← links)
