Pages that link to "Item:Q944257"
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The following pages link to Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures (Q944257):
Displaying 13 items.
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
- When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof? (Q459157) (← links)
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted (Q1642176) (← links)
- Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities (Q2013344) (← links)
- Level-k reasoning in school choice (Q2031184) (← links)
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism (Q2318116) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms (Q2357813) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)