Pages that link to "Item:Q951437"
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The following pages link to Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control (Q951437):
Displaying 35 items.
- A friendly computable characteristic function (Q309838) (← links)
- Global refunding and climate change (Q311034) (← links)
- Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs (Q471435) (← links)
- Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game (Q543809) (← links)
- Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly (Q631246) (← links)
- A dynamic game of waste management (Q846517) (← links)
- Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control (Q951437) (← links)
- Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset (Q959699) (← links)
- Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model (Q964306) (← links)
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought? (Q1038409) (← links)
- Intertemporal transfer institutions (Q1317322) (← links)
- The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities (Q1365004) (← links)
- Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games (Q1411498) (← links)
- Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control (Q1592889) (← links)
- Trade as transfers, GATT and the core (Q1606433) (← links)
- Node-consistent Shapley value for games played over event trees with random terminal time (Q1682982) (← links)
- Convergence of strong time-consistent payment schemes in dynamic games (Q1740135) (← links)
- Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees (Q1785419) (← links)
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction (Q1853200) (← links)
- Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games (Q2152344) (← links)
- Node-consistent core for games played over event trees (Q2409447) (← links)
- Management of a transboundary wildlife population: A self-enforcing cooperative agreement with renegotiation and variable transfer payments (Q2477724) (← links)
- Balanced environmental games (Q2567170) (← links)
- A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects (Q2573910) (← links)
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries (Q3184582) (← links)
- Strategic Support of Node-Consistent Cooperative Outcomes in Dynamic Games Played Over Event Trees (Q3188752) (← links)
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (Q3616618) (← links)
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION (Q3616626) (← links)
- The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia (Q4211616) (← links)
- Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees (Q4604875) (← links)
- COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (Q4916137) (← links)
- Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements (Q4979986) (← links)
- Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis (Q6066280) (← links)
- Who pays the bill? Climate change, taxes, and transfers in a multi-region growth model (Q6094459) (← links)
- Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees (Q6495229) (← links)
