Pages that link to "Item:Q969126"

The following pages link to Informational control and organizational design (Q969126):

Displaying 28 items.

• Optimal sequential delegation (Q281407) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors (Q308659) (← links)
• A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space (Q324159) (← links)
• Dynamic learning and strategic communication (Q328555) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender (Q503060) (← links)
• Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate (Q726619) (← links)
• Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights (Q836879) (← links)
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition (Q893400) (← links)
• On authority distributions in organizations: Controls. (Q1413216) (← links)
• Strategic gradual learning and information transmission (Q1622377) (← links)
• Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control (Q1668263) (← links)
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk (Q1675010) (← links)
• Information control in reputational cheap talk (Q1682714) (← links)
• Ambiguous persuasion (Q1757548) (← links)
• The organization of expertise in the presence of communication (Q1944864) (← links)
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages (Q2025013) (← links)
• Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms (Q2074049) (← links)
• Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring (Q2078070) (← links)
• Cheap talk with private signal structures (Q2078074) (← links)
• Experimental design to persuade (Q2343397) (← links)
• Optimal limited authority for principal (Q2434229) (← links)
• Monitored by your friends, not your foes: strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority (Q2442858) (← links)
• (Q3337210) (← links)
• Optimal Dissent in Organizations (Q3394007) (← links)
• Incomplete Information, Task Assignment, and Managerial Control Systems (Q4356624) (← links)
• Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult (Q6142576) (← links)
• Benefiting from bias: delegating to encourage information acquisition (Q6537234) (← links)
• Cheap talk with two-sided private information (Q6665670) (← links)