Pages that link to "Item:Q996382"

The following pages link to Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382):

Displaying 11 items.

• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680) (← links)
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents'' [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] (Q643288) (← links)
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
• Optimal contracts with contingent allocation (Q777726) (← links)
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design (Q1877157) (← links)
• Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design (Q2173101) (← links)
• A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability (Q2178639) (← links)
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents (Q2386136) (← links)
• (Q5365075) (← links)
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (Q5393885) (← links)
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)