Pages that link to "Item:Q1005239"
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The following pages link to The stable marriage problem with master preference lists (Q1005239):
Displaying 27 items.
- The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas (Q261379) (← links)
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools (Q329714) (← links)
- Popular matchings with variable item copies (Q631788) (← links)
- Geometric stable roommates (Q976079) (← links)
- Stable marriage and indifference (Q1317047) (← links)
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents (Q1626247) (← links)
- Maximum locally stable matchings (Q1736563) (← links)
- Almost mutually best in matching markets: rank gaps and size of the core (Q2068882) (← links)
- Bribery and control in stable marriage (Q2109958) (← links)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories (Q2140313) (← links)
- Stable marriage with groups of similar agents (Q2190408) (← links)
- Solving hard stable matching problems involving groups of similar agents (Q2205948) (← links)
- (Q3180713) (← links)
- Stable Matchings with Ties, Master Preference Lists, and Matroid Constraints (Q3449577) (← links)
- The Price of Matching with Metric Preferences (Q3452808) (← links)
- (Q4938640) (← links)
- A Matroid Generalization of the Super-Stable Matching Problem (Q5084102) (← links)
- Pairwise Preferences in the Stable Marriage Problem (Q5090469) (← links)
- Jointly stable matchings (Q5136277) (← links)
- Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage (Q5154751) (← links)
- Maximum stable matching with one-sided ties of bounded length (Q5918705) (← links)
- Hedonic diversity games: a complexity picture with more than two colors (Q6067039) (← links)
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list (Q6091175) (← links)
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences (Q6109539) (← links)
- Recognizing when a preference system is close to admitting a master list (Q6124592) (← links)
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list (Q6156344) (← links)
- Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences (Q6188265) (← links)
