Pages that link to "Item:Q1269785"
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The following pages link to Executive compensation: a calibration approach (Q1269785):
Displaying 16 items.
- A conditional logit model for executive incentives (Q374875) (← links)
- Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation (Q538487) (← links)
- Own-company stockholding and work effort preferences of an unconstrained executive (Q607672) (← links)
- Stock grants as a commitment device (Q959669) (← links)
- Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model (Q1371188) (← links)
- Performance regularity: a new class of executive compensation packages (Q1934586) (← links)
- Optimal investment for executive stockholders with exponential utility (Q1938901) (← links)
- Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts (Q1943439) (← links)
- Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard (Q1994432) (← links)
- Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm (Q2490712) (← links)
- Stock options and managerial optimal contracts (Q2572505) (← links)
- Information-Based Stock Trading, Executive Incentives, and the Principal-Agent Problem (Q3117282) (← links)
- Inside Debt* (Q3169197) (← links)
- Option Compensation and Industry Competition (Q3395701) (← links)
- How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?* (Q4555694) (← links)
- Identifying and Testing Models of Managerial Compensation (Q4610736) (← links)