Pages that link to "Item:Q1317328"
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The following pages link to Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard (Q1317328):
Displaying 13 items.
- Pre-sale information (Q654512) (← links)
- Competing for talents (Q694731) (← links)
- Agency in a market setting (Q1312881) (← links)
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models (Q1584552) (← links)
- A multi-criteria agency model with incomplete preference information. (Q1584824) (← links)
- Damned if you do and damned if you don't: two masters (Q1622352) (← links)
- When vagueness induces indirect competition: Strategic incompleteness of contracts (Q1852679) (← links)
- Nonexclusive competition for a freelancer under adverse selection (Q2101447) (← links)
- Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword (Q2211493) (← links)
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent (Q4320058) (← links)
- Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency Without Communication (Q4579842) (← links)
- Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle (Q5118434) (← links)
- Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models (Q6059546) (← links)