The following pages link to I. R. Segal' (Q1335776):
Displaying 21 items.
- (Q840675) (redirect page) (← links)
- The communication cost of selfishness (Q840676) (← links)
- On a class of control laws in the activity analysis problem with limited resources (Q1335777) (← links)
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? (Q1421881) (← links)
- Pareto-optimal controls in the multi-activity scheduling problem are generalized priority controls (Q1816321) (← links)
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets (Q2455666) (← links)
- The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (Q2496786) (← links)
- Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining (Q3044087) (← links)
- A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining) (Q3081388) (← links)
- Nash implementation with little communication (Q3574371) (← links)
- (Q3594547) (← links)
- (Q3624052) (← links)
- Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts (Q4262863) (← links)
- Contracting with Externalities (Q4262977) (← links)
- Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach (Q4615855) (← links)
- Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities (Q5028526) (← links)
- An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism (Q5397567) (← links)
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities (Q5472968) (← links)
- The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing) (Q5474960) (← links)
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets (Q5474973) (← links)
- Algorithms - ESA 2003 (Q5897238) (← links)