Pages that link to "Item:Q1338121"
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The following pages link to Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms (Q1338121):
Displaying 39 items.
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428) (← links)
- Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty (Q521877) (← links)
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
- Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828) (← links)
- In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
- Marriage matching and gender satisfaction (Q733764) (← links)
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents (Q1026251) (← links)
- Incentive-consistent matching processes for problems with ex ante pricing (Q1339741) (← links)
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets (Q1371137) (← links)
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment (Q1735739) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets (Q1800976) (← links)
- Protective behavior in matching models (Q1804637) (← links)
- On randomized matching mechanisms (Q1814960) (← links)
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market (Q1906447) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
- Quantile stable mechanisms (Q2052538) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives (Q2164331) (← links)
- Strategic disaggregation in matching markets (Q2231418) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Reward maximization in general dynamic matching systems (Q2326234) (← links)
- Corrigendum to ``On randomized matching mechanisms'' [Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 377--381] (Q2373372) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare (Q2437848) (← links)
- Random matching in the college admissions problem (Q2472434) (← links)
- On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms (Q2487967) (← links)
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets (Q2519489) (← links)
- Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (Q3382383) (← links)
- Dynamically stable matching (Q6059528) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain (Q6176744) (← links)
- A Bayesian framework for modelling the preferential selection process in respondent-driven sampling (Q6664995) (← links)