Pages that link to "Item:Q1577956"

The following pages link to Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result (Q1577956):

Displaying 18 items.

• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets (Q700115) (← links)
• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs (Q705875) (← links)
• An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs (Q705876) (← links)
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach (Q863265) (← links)
• The value of commitment in contests and tournaments when observation is costly (Q926789) (← links)
• Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance (Q975372) (← links)
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment (Q1378028) (← links)
• Commitment and observability in games (Q1804635) (← links)
• What limits escalation? - Varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment (Q1927326) (← links)
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities (Q2267373) (← links)
• Commitment and observability in a contracting environment (Q2389297) (← links)
• Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result (Q2404219) (← links)
• Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction (Q2486154) (← links)
• From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence (Q2499521) (← links)
• A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games (Q2907967) (← links)
• Ordering in Games with Reduced Memory and Planning Horizon of Players (Q5057953) (← links)
• (Q5167127) (← links)
• Rules and commitment in communication: an experimental analysis (Q6536470) (← links)