Pages that link to "Item:Q1684126"
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The following pages link to Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (Q1684126):
Displaying 9 items.
- Sticky matching in school choice (Q683828) (← links)
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted (Q1642176) (← links)
- Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
- School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms (Q2051001) (← links)
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- Stability vs. no justified envy (Q6665684) (← links)