Pages that link to "Item:Q1764287"
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The following pages link to On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model (Q1764287):
Displaying 19 items.
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
- School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds (Q406428) (← links)
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- Group stability in matching with interdependent values (Q490943) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (Q969481) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602) (← links)
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility (Q1651280) (← links)
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (Q1934818) (← links)
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts (Q1958950) (← links)
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts (Q2036921) (← links)
- On the number of employed in the matching model (Q2425191) (← links)
- An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems (Q2452262) (← links)
- A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching (Q5146917) (← links)
- A strongly group strategyproof and shill resistant bargaining mechanism for fog resource pricing (Q6657677) (← links)
