Pages that link to "Item:Q1811244"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation. (Q1811244):
Displaying 29 items.
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness (Q532698) (← links)
- Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking (Q733784) (← links)
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition (Q862542) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains (Q1014329) (← links)
- Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes (Q1363527) (← links)
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740) (← links)
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences (Q1704048) (← links)
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (Q1887542) (← links)
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary (Q1920961) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- Dictatorship versus manipulability (Q2334835) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? (Q2389767) (← links)
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056) (← links)
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (Q2500745) (← links)
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules (Q2695439) (← links)
- In Silico Voting Experiments (Q2829686) (← links)
- PADUA Protocol: Strategies and Tactics (Q3524955) (← links)
- (Q4614094) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
- A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation (Q5868914) (← links)
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)
