Pages that link to "Item:Q1884638"

The following pages link to Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option (Q1884638):

Displaying 13 items.

• Single-dipped preferences with satiation: strong group strategy-proofness and unanimity (Q331702) (← links)
• Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient? (Q423715) (← links)
• The division problem with voluntary participation (Q427509) (← links)
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result (Q645639) (← links)
• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities (Q665078) (← links)
• On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules (Q826632) (← links)
• The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints (Q899384) (← links)
• On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference (Q1675038) (← links)
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences (Q1876655) (← links)
• The capacity constrained facility location problem (Q2212775) (← links)
• Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences (Q2272186) (← links)
• Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (Q2415985) (← links)
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness (Q2452137) (← links)