Pages that link to "Item:Q1905051"

The following pages link to An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives (Q1905051):

Displaying 38 items.

• A generalization of Hamilton's rule -- love others how much? (Q289425) (← links)
• Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation (Q538504) (← links)
• Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences (Q665104) (← links)
• The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance (Q829503) (← links)
• Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules (Q977852) (← links)
• Mechanisms for similarity based cooperation (Q978642) (← links)
• Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability (Q1036581) (← links)
• Exploring the cooperative regimes in an agent-based model: indirect reciprocity vs. selfish incentives (Q1396859) (← links)
• Political institutions and the evolution of character traits (Q1682729) (← links)
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli (Q1735746) (← links)
• Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets (Q1741201) (← links)
• Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling (Q1786988) (← links)
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible (Q1797579) (← links)
• Assortment and reciprocity mechanisms for promotion of cooperation in a model of multilevel selection (Q2080798) (← links)
• Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs (Q2121454) (← links)
• Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy (Q2125100) (← links)
• Evolution of revealing emotions (Q2133095) (← links)
• Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining (Q2136939) (← links)
• Labelling, homophily and preference evolution (Q2178634) (← links)
• Contract theory for the evolution of cooperation: the right incentives attract the right partners (Q2261647) (← links)
• Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: the impact of higher-order history (Q2278929) (← links)
• Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games (Q2338668) (← links)
• Equilibrium vengeance (Q2389306) (← links)
• A note on ``Evolution of preferences'' (Q2399685) (← links)
• Coaction versus reciprocity in continuous-time models of cooperation (Q2415543) (← links)
• An evolutionary analysis of buyer insurance and seller reputation in online markets (Q2461758) (← links)
• On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation (Q2481222) (← links)
• Cooperators and reciprocators: a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior (Q2512341) (← links)
• An Evolutionary Game Theory Strategy for Carbon Emission Reduction in the Electricity Market (Q4557740) (← links)
• Compliance with Social Norms as an Evolutionary Stable Equilibrium (Q5140369) (← links)
• EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (Q5467125) (← links)
• Introducing to the evolution of preferences (Q5938044) (← links)
• Preference evolution and reciprocity (Q5938047) (← links)
• Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation (Q6074842) (← links)
• Survival of altruistic preferences in a large population public goods game (Q6093683) (← links)
• Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences in two-player assortative interactions with complete and incomplete information and plasticity (Q6124791) (← links)
• Evolution of preferences in multiple populations (Q6146793) (← links)
• Changing behaviour under unfairness: an evolutionary model of the ultimatum game (Q6570302) (← links)