Pages that link to "Item:Q1906707"
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The following pages link to Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof (Q1906707):
Displaying 24 items.
- Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains (Q483577) (← links)
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness (Q647541) (← links)
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation (Q697840) (← links)
- Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem (Q700081) (← links)
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges (Q1272626) (← links)
- Voting under constraints (Q1371133) (← links)
- A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules (Q1381966) (← links)
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers (Q1680148) (← links)
- Partially efficient voting by committees (Q1919693) (← links)
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good (Q1976440) (← links)
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model (Q2013360) (← links)
- Random dictatorship domains (Q2016232) (← links)
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (Q2248911) (← links)
- A characterization of possibility domains in strategic voting (Q2338654) (← links)
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes (Q2386317) (← links)
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies (Q2431829) (← links)
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good (Q2453417) (← links)
- Voting by committees under constraints (Q2485953) (← links)
- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences (Q2829677) (← links)
- Voting by Committees (Q3362064) (← links)
- ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS (Q4634427) (← links)
- Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters (Q4644765) (← links)
- Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains (Q6100490) (← links)
- Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains (Q6105383) (← links)
