Pages that link to "Item:Q1920919"
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The following pages link to On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal (Q1920919):
Displaying 13 items.
- The strategically ignorant principal (Q523523) (← links)
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability (Q900426) (← links)
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships (Q1181232) (← links)
- Strategic transmission of information and short-term commitment (Q1300685) (← links)
- Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited (Q1927327) (← links)
- Optimal contracts with random monitoring (Q2121460) (← links)
- Dynamic contracts with random monitoring (Q2283129) (← links)
- Optimal limited authority for principal (Q2434229) (← links)
- The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity (Q2436311) (← links)
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication (Q2455660) (← links)
- Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship (Q3028670) (← links)
- Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent (Q4320058) (← links)
- Performance in Principal-Agent Dyads: The Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship (Q4356650) (← links)